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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This is a worker's compensation case relating to an industrial accident and injury of 
November 13, 2004, first filed on behalf of Terence Fairchild on February 18, 2005. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
The Industrial Commission assigned this matter to Referee Michael R Powers, who 
conducted a hearing in Coeur d'Alene on September 23, 2011. The hearing was continued due to 
illness of Claimant's counsel. 
On February 29, 2012, the matter was assigned to the Commissioners who conducted a 
hearing on April 17, 2012, on the issues of: 
1. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment 
benefits; 
2. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability 
benefits; and 
3. \\'hether apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code §72-406 is appropriate. 
On June 7, 2013, the Commission entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order concluding that: 
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1. ~ ....... = .. has proven that he suffered a partial PCL injury as a result of his 
industrial accident 
2. Claimant has proven that he is entitled to 3% whole person PPL 
3. Claimant has failed to prove that he is entitled to permanent disability in excess of 
impairment 
4. The issue ofldaho Code §72-406 apportionment is moot 
5. Pursua._11t to Idaho Code §72-718, this decision is final a._11d conclusive as to all 
issues adjudicated. 
Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 25, 2013, asking for reconsideration 
on the issue of disability, arguing that the Commission's conclusions are based upon a flawed 
vocational opinion by Douglas Crum. Claimant also disputed the Commission's finding on 
Claimant's credibility. On May 12, 2014, the Commission entered an Order Denying 
Reconsideration reiterating that it found the medical opinions of Williams Sims, M.D., 
Claimant's treating physician, more persuasive than other medical opinions as he was most 
familiar with Claimant's condition. It further found that there were no limitations or restrictions 
associated with the injury as diagnosed by Dr. Sims and therefore it is not in error for the 
Commission to rely on a vocational opinion of Mr. Crum, which was based, in part, on the 
conclusion that Claimant suffered no accident relating to limitations or restrictions. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
The Commission made the following findings of fact: 
Background: 
1. Claimant was born on and was 23 years old at the time 
2012 hearing. He is married with three children and currently resides in 
Vancouver, Washington. Prior to moving to Vancouver, Claimant lived in Coeur 
d'Alene, where he grew up. Claimant is a skilled musician who began playing the 
viola at the age of five. He also plays the violin and the piano. As a teenager, 
Claimant played in local quartets, orchestras, and symphonies. He testified that he 
planned to join the United States Air Force orchestra after high school in order to 
obtain financial assistance for higher education. Claimant ultimately hoped to 
attend the San Francisco Conservatory of Music. 
2. In addition to music, Claimant enjoyed athletic activities. He was an avid 
runner and weight lifter, and possibly participated in football. 2 He also worked 
part-time in high school, first as a lifeguard and later at Dairy Queen. At the time 
of his accident, Claimant was a cook for Employer, earning $7.15 per hour and 
working 15 hours per week. His duties included food preparation and kitchen 
clean-up. 
Accident and Medical Treatment 
3. On November 13, 2004, Claimant was carrying garbage out to a dumpster when 
he slipped on ice and fell on a concrete barrier, striking his knees. The impact 
caused Claimant's knees to bleed. He went inside to bandage his knees and inform 
his supervisor of the accident. His father picked him up at the end of his shift. 
4. Claimant did not immediately seek medical treatment for his injuries, but on 
December 16, 2004, he presented to Howard N. Brinton, M.D., at the After Hours 
Care Clinic in Coeur d'Alene. Claimant complained of ongoing knee pain, 
"particularly in the anterior aspect of his knees just below his knee caps." D.E. 3, 
p. 41. Claimant stated that he had never had similar pain before. Dr. Brinton 
examined Claimant and diagnosed patellofemoral pain following bilateral patella 
2 It is unclear from the record whether Claimant actually participated in organized sports. At the 2012 
hearing, he testified that he played football, but during his deposition on April 19, 2005. he testified that he 
was not on any sports team. 
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contusions. Dr. Brinton prescribed knee braces and stretching exercises, as well as 
Naprosyn and ice. He advised Claimant that he should avoid running, jumping, 
and "duress" bending, stooping, and kneeling. Id 
5. Claimant followed up with Dr. Brinton on December 23, 2004. Claimant 
continued to suffer pain in both knees, despite the use of braces. Dr. Brinton 
prescribed physical therapy, which failed to alleviate Claimant's symptoms. 
6. On January 6, 2005, Claimant returned to Dr. Brinton. Testing revealed "pain 
with medial structure, joint loading, particularly posterior aspect" D.E. 3, p. 38. 
Dr. Brinton suspected internal derangement involving the left medial meniscus 
posterior horn. He ordered an MRI of the left knee, which was performed on 
JanuarJ 11, 2005. The MRI revealed that the meniscus was intact. Claimant's 
cruciate ligaments, anterior and posterior, also appeared to be intact 
7. Dr. Brinton reviewed the MRI scan with an orthopedist, Dr. Adam Olscamp, 
who stated that Claimant's treatment should consist of ambulation as tolerated. 
Dr. Brinton continued Claimant on physical therapy and anti-inflammatory 
medication. At the request of Claimant's father, Dr. Brinton referred Claimant to 
William F. Sims, M.D., for a second opinion. 
8. Claimant presented to Dr. Sims, an orthopedic surgeon, on March 1, 2005. 
After examining Claimant and reviewing his medical records, Dr. Sims suspected 
that Claimant had a partial PCL injury in his right knee. Dr. Sims recommended 
an MRI of the right knee, but Claimant apparently did not follow up on the 
recommendation. He did not return to Dr. Sims until nine months later, on 
December 13, 2005. Because of Claimant's persistent pain, Dr. Sims 
recommended MRI evaluations of both knees. These were performed on 
January 3, 2006. Radiologist Monte F. Zarlingo, M.D., recorded his findings for 
the right knee: 
The anterior cruciate ligament is intact. The posterior cruciate 
ligament demonstrates a focal area of signal hyperintensity within 
its distal fibers, which appears to saturate with fat saturation of 
uncertain significance. This may represent focal fat imbibed within 
the fibers. This could be the result of prior trauma and is of 
uncertain significance. The posterior cruciate ligament remains 
congruent. No evidence of an acute tear is seen. 
D.E. 5, p. 61. The left knee MRI revealed no cartilage injury. 
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9. Claimant presented to Dr. Sims for follow-up on March 3, 2006. He reported 
that he continued to experience pain in both knees, but the right knee was more 
painful. Dr. Sims examined Claimant and reviewed the MRI results. Dr. Sims 
noted that Claimant's right knee MRI showed evidence of a PCL injury, and that 
this was consistent with an observed increase in laxity in Claimant's right knee. 
Dr. Sims diagnosed a partial right knee PCL injury and recommended a 
corticosteroid injection. Claimant agreed to undergo the procedure. 
10. On March 31, 2006, Claimant reported to Dr. Sims that he experienced some 
relief from the injection, but his symptoms had returned. Dr. Sims discussed 
further treatment with Claimant but warned that an operative intervention would 
not likely be beneficial: 
I explained to him that ... a reconstructive effort may return somebody to 
grade 2 laxity findings, which he presently has or slightly better. 
D.E. 5, p. 56. After this appointment, Claimant did not return to Dr. Sims for 
almost a year. 
11. On January 29, 2007, Claimant presented to Dr. Sims for evaluation. Claimant 
reported that he had returned to lifting weights and was also cycling. However, 
when he attempted to run, he felt "significant pressure" in his right knee. On 
examination, Dr. Sims found "approximate grade 2 [laxity] findings with external 
rotation of the foot, which improves to 1 + findings with internal rotation of the 
foot." D.E. 5, p. 55. Dr. Sims reiterated his belief that while Claimant had a right 
PCL injury, his laxity findings indicated that operative reconstruction would not 
improve his condition. Dr. Sims recognized that his opinion on surgery was 
"somewhat debatable" and said a second opinion would be reasonable. Id. 
12. On April 30, 2007, Claimant presented to Tycho E. Kersten, M.D., for a 
second opinion regarding surgery. After examining Claimant, Dr. Kersten 
concurred with Dr. Sims's diagnosis of a partial PCL injury, noting, "[Claimant] 
certainly does have some laxity." D.E. 6, p. 72. He also agreed that surgery would 
not be beneficial to Claimant: 
In the big picture, I think surgery is unlikely to change his symptoms and 
his condition much, and, as such, I would be in agreement with Dr. Sims 
that conservative treatment is the treatment of choice here .... 
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With regards to the PCL surgery, surgery is a big deal with a low likelihood of 
being able to improve on his current stability/instability pattern .... [Surgery] is 
unlikely to reliably improve his condition. 
Id. 
13. On September 20, 2007, Claimant underwent an independent medical 
examination (IME) with William R. Pace III, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, and 
Linda Wray, M.D., a neurologist.3 Dr. Pace reviewed Claimant's medical records, 
including the MRls, and performed an examination of Claimant. He noted that 
Claimant walked with a normal gait. No laxity was observed. Dr. Pace found that 
Claimant was medically stable and had sustained no PPL Dr. Pace declined to 
place any restrictions or limitations on Claimant. 
14. After receiving the IME report, Surety forwarded it to Dr. Sims and asked if 
he agreed with the findings. Dr. Sims indicated that he did not: 
The [patient] does have increased laxity on [right] knee [posterior] 
drawer exam (partial PCL injury) -- According to table 17.33 AMA 
Guides to PPI, this is consistent with a 3% whole person impairment 
rating -- re "mild cruciate ligament laxity." 
D.E. 5, p. 50. Surety then asked Dr. Pace to respond to Dr. Sims's opinion. 
Dr. Pace stated that his own opinion remained unchanged, as he observed no 
laxity on his examination of Claimant. 
15. On April 23, 2009, Claimant underwent a functional capacity evaluation 
(FCE) performed by Mark Bengtson, M.P.T. Mr. Bengtson observed laxity 
consistent with a chronic PCL injury. Mr. Bengtson concluded that Claimant had 
"significant limitations" in walking, stair and ladder climbing, and weight bearing 
tolerance during prolonged ambulation. C.E. B, p. 3. He believed that Claimant 
would have difficulty performing work in medium or heavy duty jobs that 
required walking or standing more than 50% of the time. He noted that Claimant 
was capable of light duty work with standing and walking up to 50% of an eight-
hour work day. However, he also noted that Claimant's walking and prolonged 
ambulation limitations were not permanent and could be improved in physical 
therapy. 
3 Dr. Wray examined Claimant for an alleged injury unrelated to this claim. 
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16. On June 29, 2010, Claimant's counsel sent the FCE report to Dr. Sims. 
Counsel indicated that Claimant was seeking Surety approval for an appointment 
with Dr. Sims, but in a response sent on July 13, 2010, Dr. Sims ,vrote that it 
would be in Claimant's "best interest" to be seen by another physician. D.E. 5, 
p. 48. 
17. On September 16, 2010, Dr. Pace saw Claimant for a second He 
reviewed Claimant's medical records again, as well as the FCE. He also 
conducted a physical examination. Claimant reported that he continued to suffer 
from dull bilateral knee pain, with occasional sharp pains under his right kneecap. 
On examination, Dr. Pace observed no laxity. He reported that his opinion 
remained the same. He wrote: 
I believe Mr. Fairchild's current complaints are consistent with bilateral 
patellofemoral pain syndrome. This is common in young adults. There is 
no good curative treatment for it Quadriceps strengthening exercises 
could be helpful. The [FCE's] comments regarding the "desperate need 
for a comprehensive lumbopelvic femoral balancing and strengthening 
program" are a little bit difficult for me to accept. This gentleman seems 
to be reasonably fit He is working without any specific restrictions. I 
think his knee complaints are reaL They may be minimally related to the 
slip and fall incident in 2004, but I would not consider that incident to be 
the major contributing cause to his present complaints. 
As in 2007, I failed to find any evidence in support of a diagnosis of a 
posterior cruciate ligament injury in the right knee. I think this is sort of 
a case of "the emperor's clothes" and I doubt the [FCE] came up with 
this diagnosis on a blind basis, but probably read it in the documentation. 
Certainly there is nothing on the MRI to support the diagnosis and, as I 
pointed out previously, even if there were a partial posterior cruciate 
ligament injury in 2004, it would have resolved by now. It is probably 
also worth nothing that I find it difficult to work out a mechanism of 
injury to the posterior cruciate ligament that would be caused by a slip 
and fall forward on an icy surface. The injury described is much more 
consistent with contusions to the patellae than with an injury to either 
cruciate ligament. 
D.E. 1, p. 5. Dr. Pace opined that he would not put any restrictions on Claimant, 
as he "looked carefully at the functional capacities evaluation and failed to see the 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 7 
basis for restricting this man to light industrial work with limited standing." Id. 
at 6. 
18. On August 31, 2011, John M. McNulty, M.D., examined Claimant at his 
request. Dr. McNulty recorded Claimant's complaints as bilateral knee pain, right 
more than left, with difficulty going up and down stairs. Dr. McNulty agreed with 
Dr. Sims that Claimant suffered a PCL injury; however, Dr. McNulty opined that 
Claimant's laxity was moderate, rather than mild, and that Claimant was entitled 
to 7% PPI under the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 
5th Edition. Dr. McNulty did not assign any limitations or restrictions. 
Post-Accident Employment 
19. After his accident in 2004, Claimant worked his next two scheduled shifts but 
was terminated by Employer soon after. Claimant's testimony regarding his 
separation from Employer is contradictory. At his deposition on April 19, 2005, 
Claimant testified that he skipped his third post-accident shift to play at a concert 
with the Coeur d'Alene Symphony. When Claimant's supervisor called to ask 
where he was, Claimant replied that his "knees hurt and [he] would rather play the 
concert" than go to work; after this, he was discharged. D.E. 9, p. 97. In contrast, 
at hearing, Claimant testified that he worked for several weeks after the accident, 
but was discharged because of his post-accident physical limitations: 
They would not work with my limitations. They didn't really comply to 
not being able to lift or not being able to move quickly to their standards 
or to their customer demand ... I did ask them just to find -- maybe if I 
can just stay on register all day or do some light cleaning up for them. 
But they ultimately found that there was nothing that I could do in the 
company that would benefit them. So I -- my employment was ended 
after they found no use for me. 
Hearing Tr. 29-30. 
20. Claimant testified that after leaving Employer, he attempted to work at Target 
but was unable to handle the position's physical demands. He then attained a night 
job cleaning at McDonald's. Upon graduating high school in 2005, Claimant 
enrolled at North Idaho College to study music. He testified that he was unable to 
follow through on his plan to join the Air Force because a recruiter looked over 
his medical records and told Claimant that he would not qualify physically. 
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21 While in college, Claimant worked at Carl's Jr. as a shift manager, earning 
$9.00-9.60 per hour. He left the job after two years due to a conflict with a former 
co-worker. 
22. Claimant graduated in 2007 with an associate's degree in music education. He 
testified that he wanted to pursue an advanced degree at the University ofldaho or 
Eastern Washington University but was unable to afford it. 
23. Claimant began to work at Center Partners, a call center, where he handled 
customer service calls for various companies. He worked there from 2007 until 
July 2010,4 when he was laid off. 
24. Unable to find work in Coeur d'Alene, Claimant moved to Vancouver, 
Washington, where he secured a position with Home Depot. At the time of 
hearing, Claimant was still with Home Depot, earning $8.95 per hour and working 
anywhere from 15 to 30 hours per week. 
25. While he lived in Coeur d'Alene, Claimant was able to supplement his income 
through musical performances; he belonged to a quartet that would play at events 
such as weddings. Claimant testified that his injury has not affected his ability to 
play; however, he does not have the connections in Vancouver that he did in 
Coeur d'Alene and has struggled to find music-related employment. He 
unsuccessfully looked for work as an elementary school music teacher. He would 
need an advanced degree to teach music at a middle school, high school, or 
college. Claimant testified that he would like to continue his education but is 
currently focused on supporting his family. 
Vocational Opinions 
26. Claimant retained Dan Brownell, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, to 
provide an opinion on the extent of Claimant's permanent disability. 
Mr. Brownell interviewed Claimant and reviewed his medical records and FCE. 
Mr. Brownell opined that Claimant sustained 28% or greater PPD based on his 
physical limitations as well as his limited education. 
27. Defendants retained Douglas Crum, also a vocational rehabilitation consultant, 
to opine on the extent of Claimant's permanent disability. After interviewing 
4 In 2009, Claimant left Center Partners after he violated the company's attendance policy. He 
was eligible for rehire and returned after a few months. During the interim, he worked at Panda 
Express. 
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Claimant and reviewing his records, including the FCE, Mr. Crum concluded that 
Claimant sustained no permanent disability in excess of impairment. He explained 
that none of Claimant's doctors assigned permanent restrictions or indicated that 
the FCE was an accurate representation of Claimant's physical abilities. 
Furthermore, Claimant has earned a higher wage in his post-injury positions than 
he did at his time-of-injury position and therefore has suffered no appreciable 
wage loss. According to Mr. Crum, Claimant's post-injury jobs are consistent 
with his age and level of education. 
Credibility 
28. Having reviewed the record and observed Claimant at hearing, the 
Corr-,rnissioners find that Claimant is not a credible witness. His hearing testimony 
differed from his prior statements in depositions, interviews, and appointments 
with medical providers. As mentioned above, he told strikingly different stories 
regarding his separation from Employer. He was also inconsistent about his 
involvement in organized sports and his academic achievements. At deposition, 
he testified that in college, he was a "great" student who earned As and Bs; to 
Mr. Crum, he stated that he was an average student in both high school and 
college, graduating at North Idaho College with a 2.5 GP A. See D.E. 10, p. 111; 
D.E. 13, p. 135. Claimant also appears to be prone to exaggeration. He boasted to 
Dr. Sims that, prior to his injury, he ran twenty miles per day. See D.E. 5, p. 68. 
(At hearing, this changed to the far more plausible five miles per day; see Hearing 
Tr. 23.) He insists that he used to be able to leg press 1,375 pounds. Hearing 
Tr. 23. It is difficult for the Commission to credit such extraordinary athletic feats 
to an adolescent who attended school full-time, worked part-time, and was heavily 
involved in music. Having considered all of the above, the Commission regards 
Claimant's testimony as suspect where it is not supported by other evidence in the 
record. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
Causation 
30. Causation was not an issue noticed for hearing, but the arguments of the 
parties have made it necessary to address. Claimant contends that he is entitled to 
PPI for a PCL injury. Defendants dispute that Claimant suffered a PCL injury. 
Dr. Pace, the IME physician, believes that Claimant suffered only contusions as a 
result of the accident, and that his current symptoms are consistent with an 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 10 
unrelated condition, patellofemoral pain syndrome. 5 order to address the issue 
of PPI, we must first determine the nature of the injury Claimant suffered as a 
result of the accident. 
32. Dr. Sims did not testify in this case, but it is clear from his records that he 
believed Claimant suffered a PCL injury as a result of the accident. Dr. Sims 
expressly disagreed with Dr. Pace's IME opinion, which stated that the accident 
caused only contusions and resulted in no PPL Dr. Kersten also diagnosed a PCL 
injury, though he did not specifically opine on causation. Dr. McNulty agreed with 
Dr. Sims that Claimant suffered a PCL injury as a result of the accident. Dr. Sims, 
Dr. McNulty, and Dr. Kersten all noted findings on examination that were 
consistent with a PCL injury, notably laxity. Mr. Bengtson also observed laxity 
consistent with a partial PCL injury. 
33. Dr. Pace, who conducted two IMEs, is the only physician who did not 
diagnose a PCL injury. He described the concurring diagnoses of his peers as a 
case of the "emperor's new clothes," in which later physicians pretended to see an 
injury that a prior doctor diagnosed. Dr. Pace avers that Claimant's MRis revealed 
no evidence of a PCL injury. This would seem to ignore the interpretation of 
Dr. Zarlingo, the radiologist, who noted abnormalities in Claimant's PCL and 
stated that they could be the result of "prior trauma." See ,I 8 above. Dr. Zarlingo 
did not clarify what he meant by prior trauma, but Dr. Sims believed the MRI was 
consistent with an accident-related PCL injury. (The MRI was taken more than 
one year after Claimant's accident, and Claimant had no pre-accident history of 
knee trauma.) 
34. Dr. Pace essentially disputes the PCL diagnosis for two reasons. First, he 
observed no laxity during his two examinations; second, he does not believe that a 
frontal impact on the knees, of the sort suffered by Claimant, would cause an 
injury to a posterior ligament. We find neither of these reasons persuasive. What 
Dr. Pace observed in two examinations of Claimant does not outweigh what 
Dr. Sims observed in almost two years of treatment. Dr. Pace hypothesized that 
Dr. Sims, Dr. Kersten, and Dr. McNulty all mistook Claimant's recurvatum, a 
knee deformity, for laxity, and that this explains their findings on examination, 
but we have difficulty believing that three doctors would make the same mistake. 
As for Dr. Pace's doubts about the mechanism of Claimant's injury, we note that 
5 In his hearing exhibits, Claimant included excerpts about patellofemoral pain syndrome and how 
it may be caused by trauma. However, no doctor in this case has opined that Claimant suffered 
patellofemoral pain syndrome as a result of his industrial accident; there is therefore no need to 
address this condition. 
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no other physician this case expressed similar doubts. Dr. McNulty stated in his 
report that the "mechanism of injury, which would be a direct blow to the anterior 
tibia with posteriorly directed forces, is consistent with injury" to the PCL. C.E.H. 
Dr. Sims, the physician most familiar with Claimant's knee condition, suspected a 
PCL injury after Claimant's first appointment and confirmed it after studying 
Claimant's right knee MRI. We find the diagnosis of Dr. Sims, which Dr. Kersten 
and Dr. McNulty agreed with, convincing. 
35. Claimant suffered a right partial PCL injury as a result of his industrial 
accident. 
PPI 
37. Two PPI ratings for Claimant's PCL injury are in the record. In 2007, 
Dr. Sims assigned a 3 % whole person rating for mild laxity. In 2011, Dr. McNulty 
assigned a 7% whole person rating for moderate laxity. Both ratings were based 
on the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition. 
38. Dr. Sims's rating was contemporaneous in time to the finding that Claimant 
was medically stable, whereas Dr. McNulty' s rating was based on an examination 
conducted several years later. Dr. Sims's rating was also based on his knowledge 
as Claimant's treating physician, whereas Dr. McNulty's rating was based on a 
single examination. We find Dr. Sims's rating to be more credible. 
39. Claimant is entitled to 3% whole person PPI for his PCL injury. 
Permanent Disability 
41. Two vocational opinions have been offered in this case. Mr. Brownell, at 
Claimant's request, analyzed the Coeur d'Alene labor market6 and opined that 
Claimant suffered 28% or greater PPD as a result of the accident. Mr. Brownell 
based his rating on the limitations detailed in the FCE as well as on the 
nonmedical factor of Claimant's limited education. Mr. Crum, at Defendants' 
request, also conducted a disability analysis. Mr. Crum pointed out that no 
medical doctor has imposed restrictions on Claimant or adopted the conclusions 
of the FCE. Furthermore, Claimant has suffered no wage loss, as every one of his 
post-accident positions has paid a higher wage than his time-of-injury position. 
Finally, Mr. Crum stated that Claimant's employment history is consistent with 
6 The analysis should have been for the labor market in Vancouver, Claimant's time-of-hearing 
place ofresidence. See Davaz v. Priest River Glass, 125 Idaho 333, 870 P.2d 1292 (1994). 
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someone of his age and level of educational attainment. Mr. Crum concluded that 
Claimant suffered no disability in excess of impairment. 
42. Claimant argues that some consideration should be paid to the fact that he was 
injured when he was in high school. It would be unreasonable, argues Claimant, to 
assume that he would have continued working in minimum wage jobs throughout 
his entire career and therefore has experienced no wage loss. Claimant dwells on 
his lost Air Force opportunity and how much his future has changed because his 
injury prevented him from joining the armed forces. Yet it would be speculative to 
conclude that, absent his knee injury, Claimant would have been accepted into the 
Air Force, much less that he would have succeeded in his plan of military service. 
We note that we have no evidence, other than Claimant's word, that he was found 
to be physically ineligible for military service; ai1d, as held above, Claimant is not 
a credible witness. We note, too, that the loss of one employment opportunity 
does not necessarily equate to an appreciable loss of labor market access. 
43. While injuries at a young age can effect an individual's ability to compete in 
the labor market in the future, Claimant has not provided evidence that his 
permanent impairment has resulted in a diminished ability to compete in an open 
labor market. As Mr. Crum stated, neither Dr. Sims nor any other medical doctor 
who evaluated Claimant assigned permanent physical restrictions to Claimant. 
Even Dr. McNulty, who examined Claimant more than two years after the FCE, 
failed to impose restrictions. The only limitations or restrictions in the record are 
those from the FCE, a one-time evaluation, performed several years after the 
accident, which acknowledged that Claimant's limitations were not necessarily 
permanent, and which failed to affirmatively connect the limitations to the 
industrial accident. Given these facts, we find that the FCE is not substantial, 
competent evidence that Claimant suffered limitations or restrictions as a result of 
his impairment. 
44. As there is no persuasive evidence in the record that Claimant's impairment 
has impeded his ability to compete in the labor market, we find that Claimant 
failed to prove that he sustained disability in excess of impairment. Claimant has 
thus failed to show that he is entitled to PPD. 
R., pp. 107-121. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 13 
II. 
RESTATED ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Commission's finding that there is no persuasive evidence in the 
record that Claimant's impairment has impeded his ability to compete in the labor market is 
supported by substantial competent evidence. 
2. Whether the Commission's finding that Claimant failed to prove that he is entitled 
to permanent disability in excess of impairment is supported by substantial competent evidence. 
3. Whether the Commission's finding that Claimant lacked credibility is clearly 
erroneous. If so, whether the evidence relied on by the Commission constitutes substantial 
competent evidence. 
III. 
WHETHER RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents claim entitlement to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.AR. 11.2, which 
directs the Court to award expenses, including attorney fees, incurred because of an appeal not 
reasonably grounded in fact or law and filed for an improper purpose. Shriner v. Rausch, 141 
Idaho 228, 232, 108 P.3d 375, 379 (2005). Attorney fees are awardable under I.A.R. Rule 11.2 
when a party requesting them proves (1) the other party's arguments are not well-grounded in 
fact, warranted by existing law, or made in good faith, and (2) the claims for an improper 
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purpose, such as unnecessary delay or increase in the cost of litigation. Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 
142 Idaho 126, 132, 124 P.3d 1002, 1008 (2005). 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The terms ofidaho's workers' compensation statute are liberally construed in favor of 
the employee. However, conflicting facts need not be construed liberally in favor of the worker." 
Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750,755,302 P.3d 718, 723 (2013). 
In reviewing decisions by the Commission, "This Court exercises free review over the 
Commission's conclusions of law, but will not disturb the Commission's factual findings if they 
are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Knowlton v. Wood River Med Ctr., 151 
Idaho 135, 140, 254 P.3d, 36, 41 (2011) (citing I.C. § 72-732)). "Substantial and competent 
evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." 
McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 584-85, 272 P.3d 554, 556-57 (2012) (quoting 
Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653,657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003)). "Substantial 
evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance." Zapata v. 
J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513,515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). The Court does not re-weigh 
the evidence, and "[t]he Commission's conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of 
evidence will not be distmbed unless they are clearly erroneous." Knowlton, 151 Idaho at 140, 
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254 P .3d at 41. All facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed before the Commission. Zapata, 132 Idaho at 515, 975 P.2d at 1180. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Whether the Commission's finding that there is no persuasive evidence in the record 
that Claimant's impairment has impeded his ability to compete in the labor market 
is supported by substantial competent evidence. 
In this particular worker's compensation proceeding as in many dealing with the issue of 
extent of permanent disability, if any, there is conflicting medical and vocational evidence. The 
usual medical roles are treating physicians, physicians who have rendered an independent 
medical evaluation requested by the claimant and physicians who have rendered independent 
medical evaluation requested by the surety. There is usually a vocational expert who testifies on 
behalf of the claimant and a vocational expert who testifies on behalf of the defendants. 
The medical evidence in the record is somewhat conflicting. The Commission first 
directed its analysis as to the nature and extent of the work injury. 
Claimant first sought medical treatment regarding his knee with Howard N. 
Brinton, M.D., on December 16, 2004. After a thorough examination by Dr. Brinton, Dr. Brinton 
indicated his impression was, "Patella femoral pain following contusion to the patellas 
bilaterally." Def. Ex. 3 at 041. Claimant followed up on December 23, 2004, and on January 6, 
2005, Dr. Brinton suspected possible internal derangement involving the left medial meniscus 
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posterior horn and ordered an MRl of the left knee. Id. at 038. Claimant underwent an MRl of the 
left knee on January 11, 2005. Id. at 033. Claimant returned to Dr. Brinton on January 13, 2005. 
Dr. Brinton noted that the radiologist thought the MRl findings may represent a stress fracture. 
Dr. Brinton discussed the case with Adam Olscamp, M.D., orthopedist, who reviewed the MRI 
and felt this was not intrachorticular and he couldn't definitely say this was caused by the 
original injury. At that time the patient's father requested a second opinion with Dr. Olscamp or 
Dr. Sims. Id at 031. Dr. Brinton referred Claimant to an orthopedist. Id. at 029. Subsequently 
Claimant was seen for a headache with Dr. Brinton on July 21, 2005. The only other medical 
record generated by Dr. Brinton was on October 11, 2007, when he indicated that he agreed with 
the IME of William W. Pace III, M.D., orthopedic surgery, and Linda Wray, M.D., neurology, of 
September 20, 2007. Jd. at 025. 
William F. Sims, M.D ., orthopedist, first saw Claimant on March 1, 2005. At that time 
Claimant had complaints of bilateral knee pain, left greater than right. Def. Ex. 5 at 068. 
Dr. Sims' assessment was (1) persistent bilateral knee pain following a slip and fall at work, left 
greater than right; and (2) probable right knee partial posterior cruciate ligament injury. Id. at 
070. Dr. Sims explained to Claimant that he could not find any evidence of ligamentous injury to 
the left knee. He had reviewed the MRl and could not find any evidence of a meniscal pathology. 
Dr. Sims recommended an MRl of the right knee. Claimant returned to see Dr. Sims on 
December 13, 2005. Id at 065. Claimant did not have the MRl as Dr. Sims suggested. Dr. Sims 
again recommended an MRl of the right knee. Claimant underwent MRls of the right and left 
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knees on January 3, 2006. Claimant returned to see Dr. Sims on March 3, 2006. He was 
scheduled to see him on January 31, 2006, but apparently that did not happen. Dr. Sims 
recommended a diagnostic corticosteroid injection of the right knee and proceeded with that. Id. 
at 057. Subsequently Claimant saw Dr. Sims on March 31, 2006. At that time Dr. Sims did not 
have any further recommendations regarding operative intervention and discussed the possibility 
of a second opinion. Claimant again returned to see Dr. Sims on January 29, 2007. At that time 
he reported he had gone back to lifting vveights as well as cycling. Id. at 055. Claimant reported 
that the corticosteroid injection helped for approximately three weeks. Claimant also reported he 
used to run a marathon a week and is now unable to run for any distances at all. Id. at 055. 
Dr. Sims indicated that he believed Claimant has a posterior cruciate ligament injury and that 
with the amount of laxity he has, Dr. Sims did not believe a PCL reconstruction would improve 
his condition. Dr. Sims again suggested a second opinion. Id. 
Claimant saw Tycho Kersten, M.D., for a second opinion on April 30, 2007, an 
orthopedist in Spokane. Dr. Kersten's assessment was: 
Partial tear right knee PCL with a Grade II injury pattern. He certainly does have 
some laxity. In the big picture, I think surgery is unlikely to change his symptoms 
and his condition much and, as such, I would be in agreement with Dr. Sims that 
conservative treatment is the treatment of choice here. 
Def. Ex. 6 at 072. 
On August 9, 2007, Dr. Sims recommended an IME. Def. Ex. 5 at 052. On October 3, 
2007, Dr. Sims, after reviewing the IME report of September 20, 2007, by William R. 
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Pace III, orthopedic surgery, and Linda Wray, neurology, stated that Claimant does 
have increased laxity on the posterior drawer exam (partial PCL injury) which is consistent with 
a 3% whole person impairment rating. Id at 050. 
Dr. Sims was contacted by Claimant on June 29, 2010, and provided with a copy of the 
Mark Bengtson functional capacity evaluation ("FCE"). Claimant's counsel was requesting an 
appointment with Dr. Sims. Dr. Sims replied on July 13, 2010, stating, "I received your letter 
dated June 29, 2010 regarding Mr. Fairchild. I feel it would be in Mr. Fairchild's best interest to 
be seen by another physician for an independent medical evaluation." Id at 048. 
Drs. Pace and Wray did an independent medical evaluation of Claimant on September 30, 
2007, relating to the injury at hand here as well as a prior injury of October 12, 2004, which is 
not the subject of these proceedings. Dr. Wray was the neurologist who addressed Claimant's 
October 12, 2004, head injury unrelated to this action. The IME doctors felt Claimant was stable 
regarding the knee injury and recommended no further treatment. In addition, they stated he has 
no permanent impairment as a result of the contusions to his knee of November 13, 2004. Def. 
Ex. 2 at 019. Further, they indicated that based on objective findings, they would place no 
restrictions on Claimant. Id at 020. Subsequently Dr. Pace was contacted by the Surety regarding 
Dr. Sims' disagreement on the impairment issue. Id at 012. Dr. Pace replied on October 18, 
2007, "Partial posterior cruciate ligament injuries typically resolve completely with conservative 
treatment. They behave very differently from complete or partial anterior cruciate ligaments. 
There is no laxity on my exam." (Emphasis supplied.) Id at O 11. 
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Claimant underwent a second IME with William Pace M.D., on September 16, 2010. 
Dr. Pace was provided with updated medical records including the Bengtson FCE. Def. Ex. 1 at 
002. Dr. Pace noted the 2007 MRI showed no injury to the ligaments or the menisci. The 
posterior cruciate ligaments in both knees appear clean. Id at 002. Dr. Pace had also noted that 
Claimant had complained of anterior knee pain with the posterior drawer test on the right but 
there was no instability noted with the anterior or posterior drawer testing in either knee. Dr. Pace 
further stated: 
Based on those findings, I felt he was fixed and stable without any ratable 
impairment. Dr. Sims disagreed and made reference to the table in the guides that 
assigned whole person impairment for posterior cruciate ligament laxity. His 
diagnosis of posterior cruciate ligament laxity was apparently based upon physical 
examination findings. I responded with my opinion, which is that partial cruciate 
ligament injuries, if in fact one occurred, generally resolve completely. 
Id at 002-003. Dr. Pace concluded: 
My opinion in this case remains unchanged. I believe Mr. Fairchild's current 
complaints are consistent with bilateral patellofemoral pain syndrome. This is 
common in young adults. There is no good curative treatment for it. Quadriceps 
strengthening exercises could be helpful. The physical therapist's comments 
regarding the "desperate need for a comprehensive lumbopelvic femoral balancing 
and strengthening program" are a little bit difficult for me to accept. This 
gentleman seems to be reasonably fit. He is working without any specific 
restrictions. I think his knee complaints are real. They may be minimally related to 
the slip and fall incident in 2004, but I would not consider that incident to be the 
major contributing cause to his present complaints. 
As in 2007, I failed to find any evidence in support of a diagnosis of a posterior 
cruciate ligament injury in the right knee. I think this is sort of a case of "the 
emperor's clothes" and I doubt the physical therapist came up with this diagnosis 
on a blind basis, but probably read it in the documentation. Certainly there is 
nothing on the MRI to support the diagnosis and, as I pointed out previously, even 
if there were a partial posterior cruciate ligament injury in 2004, it would have 
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resolved by now. It is probably also worth noting that I find it difficult to work out 
a mechanism of injury to the posterior cruciate ligament that would be caused a 
slip and forward fall on an icy surface. The injury described is much more 
consistent with contusions to the patellae than with an injury to either cruciate 
ligament. 1 
Def. Ex. 1 at 005 
Dr. Pace stated his diagnosis is bilateral patellofemoral pain syndrome and that more 
probably than not the single incident in 2004 was not the cause of his current problems with his 
patellofemoral joints. He further stated that Claimant was at maximum improvement in 2007 and 
remains so. He found no ratable impairment Contrary to what Claimant states in his brief at 
page 8, Dr. Pace stated, "I would not place any restrictions on Mr. Fairchild." Id at 006. Dr. Pace 
noted he carefully reviewed the FCE and failed to see the basis for restricting Claimant to light 
industrial work with limited standing. Id at 006. 
Claimant saw John McNulty, M.D., for an IME on August 31, 2011. Claimant's Ex. H. 
Dr. McNulty reviewed the MRI and noted a definite posterior cruciate ligan1ent injury was not 
seen. Nevertheless he believed that Claimant has a posterior cruciate ligament injury to his right 
knee noting moderate laxity of the right knee. He gave Claimant a 7% whole person impairment 
and recommended strengthening exercises. Id Of note is that Dr. McNulty did not give Claimant 
any restrictions or limitations. 
I This is consistent with Dr. Brinton's original diagnosis of December 16, 2004. Def. Ex. 3 at 041. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 21 
Mark Bengtson, at the request of Claimant's attorney, did a Work Well Functional 
Capacity Evaluation, the FCE, on April 23, 2009. The only objective test that Bengtson 
performed on the right knee of significance to him was: 
The manual posterior drawer test was of significance to me in comparison to the 
drawer test, posterior drawer test on the left lower extremity, which is important 
to compare both. Some individuals have generally lax loose joints and they are 
equivalent bilaterally. His, in my opinion, was slightly lax and graded at a I+ 
degree of laxity in the posterior drawer test on the right when compared to the 
same test on the left leg. 
Depo. of Bengtson, p. 30, 1. 24-31, I. 7. Bengtson performed multiple other tests on the right 
knee that were significant for no findings. He performed the same tests on the left knee that were 
significant for no clinical findings. Id at 31. 
The history Bengtson worked with was limited to what was relayed by Claimant and 
medical records from Dr. Sims of March 1, 2005, and January 29, 2007. Id at 26. Bengtson's 
FCE was a measure of what Claimant performed that day, nothing more, nothing less. Bengtson 
offered no opinion or suggestion as to what might be the underlying source for medical cause of 
the FCE findings. 
In summary, evidence considered by the Commission included that Claimant had no work 
related impairment- Dr. Pace; that Claimant had 3% whole person impairment from the work 
injury- Dr. Sims; and Claimant had a 7% whole person impairment - Dr. McNulty. Dr. Pace 
found Claimant had no permanent restrictions or limitations. Dr. McNulty did not give Claimant 
permanent restrictions or limitations although he concurred with the Bengtson FCE. Bengtson 
offered no opinion as to the cause of his findings. Dr. Sims did not give Claimant permanent 
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restrictions or limitations when he gave his impairment rating. The fact that Dr. Sims prescribed 
a brace during treatment is not evidence of a permanent restriction. Id, p. 55 Dr. Sims also 
stressed the importance of quadriceps and rehab as the secondary stabilizer to PCL insufficiency. 
Relying on the impairment of Dr. Sims is substantial competent evidence, particularly 
since he was Claimant's treating orthopedic surgeon at the time shortly after the occurrence of 
the injury. Relying on lack of evidence in light of opinions of Dr. Pace, Dr. Sims and the lack of 
other evidence that Claimant had permanent restrictions caused by the work injury supports the 
Commission's findings that Claimant's impairment did not impede his ability to compete in the 
labor market. 
The conclusions of vocational experts are based upon foundational facts. Douglas N. 
Crum, CDMS, prepared a report of April 1, 2012, which was an evaluation of factors that 
might lead to a finding of permanent partial disability. Def. Ex. 13. Crum noted that, 
" ... no physician has issued any permanent restrictions associated with the industrial injury to 
Mr. Fairchild's bilateral knees. Similarly, no physician has indicated that the FCE represents 
Mr. Fairchild's level of permanent physical function." Id. at 136. Consequently he concluded 
there is no basis to determine that Claimant sustained a loss of labor market access. Crum 
noted regarding the comments by Dr. Pace as to avoiding a lot of stair climbing, ladder 
climbing, sprinting or jumping activities that Claimant has never performed those activities in 
any of his prior job duties nor was required to do so. Id at 136. Crum also concluded that 
Claimant did not sustain nor will sustain any measurable loss in wage earning capacity, noting 
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Claimant is earning a wage that is higher than his time of injury wage, Claimant has earned 
more at every job he has held since the time of injury. Id at 137. As such, Crum concluded 
Claimant has not sustained any permanent partial disability in excess a permanent partial 
impairment rating. Id at 137. 
Dan Brownell prepared a preliminary su..'llillary report of employability at Claimant's 
request. Claimant Exhibit I. Brownell's report mistakenly states Claimant was making $7.16 an 
hour working 40 hours a week. Id. at 001. Brov,mell reviewed a portion of the medical records, 
which apparently did not include reports from Dr. Brinton, the 2010 report from Dr. Pace and 
other medical records. Brownell relied on the FCE of Mark Bengtson and subjective information 
from Claimant indicating he needed sedentary employment. Brownell opined, "After a detailed 
analysis I have determined and opine that the Claimant has a 28% PPD inclusive of impairment." 
Id at 004. Brownell did nothing to explain what the detailed analysis is or foundation for this 
conclusion. He doesn't reconcile the light duty category referred to by Bengtson, which Brownell 
relies upon, with his reference that Claimant is limited to sedentary work. Brownell states that in 
forming his opinion he relied on the FCE but mainly Dr. McNulty's impairment. Depo. of 
Brownell at 21, 11. 16-2L Dr. McNulty, in his report, does not address restrictions or limitations. 
Brownell did not explain how he can divine a restriction or limitation from Dr. McNulty's 
impairment or report. It is simply not there. 
The Commission found, based upon substantial evidence, that Claimant had no 
permanent restrictions. As such, it found the opinions of Crum persuasive. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 24 
B. Whether the Commission's finding that Claimant failed to prove that he is entitled 
to permanent disability in excess of impairment is supported by substantial 
competent evidence. 
Claimant has failed to carry the burden proving entitlement to disability in excess of 
impairment. 
The definition of "disability" under worker's compensation law is "a decrease in wage-
earning capacity due to injury or occupational disease, as such capacity is affected by the medical 
factor of physical impairment, and by pertinent nonrnedical factors as provided in section 72-430, 
Idaho Code." Idaho Code §72-102(11 ). A permanent disability results "when the actual or 
presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent 
impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected." 
Idaho Code §72-423. A rating of permanent disability is "an appraisal of the injured employee's 
present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical 
factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors." Idaho Code §72-425. 
Among the pertinent factors are the following: 
• The nature of the physical disablement; 
• The cumulative effect of multiple injuries; 
• The employee's occupation; 
• The employee's diminished ability to compete in the labor market within a reasonable 
geographic area; 
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• the personal and economic circumstances of employee; and 
• Other factors deemed relevant by the Commission. Idaho Code §72-430. 
The decrease in wage-earning capacity must be "due to injury or occupational disease." 
Idaho Code §72-102(11 ). Likewise, disability only results when the claimant's ability to engage 
in gainful activity is reduced or absent "because of permanent impairment." Idaho Code §72-423. 
Only after the impairment reduces the claimant's earning capacity do the pertinent nonmedical 
factors come into play. See Idaho Code §72-102(11). 
Permanent disability is a question of fact, in which the Commission considers all relevant 
medical and nonmedical factors and evaluates the purely advisory opinions of vocational experts. 
See Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 40 P.3d 91 (2002); Boley v. State, 
Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 939 P.2d 854 (1997). In sum, the focus of a 
determination of permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity. 
Sundv. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3,896 P.2d 329 (1995). The burden of establishing permanent 
disability is upon a claimant. Seese v. Idaho of Idaho, Inc., 110 Idaho 3 2, 714 P .2d 1 (1986). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Brown v. The Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605,272 P.3d 577 
(2012) stated that, as a general rule, Claimant's disability assessment should be performed as of 
the date of hearing. Under Idaho Code §72-425, a permanent disability rating is a measure of the 
injured worker's "present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity." Therefore, 
the Court reasoned, in order to assess the injured worker's "present" ability to engage in gainful 
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activity, it necessarily follows that the labor market, as it exists at the time of hearing, is the labor 
market which must be considered. 
The persuasive credible evidence is that Claimant has no limitations or restrictions from 
the work injury and therefore no disability in excess of impairment. He has no loss of earning 
capacity. This is undisputed. The only indication of a possible limitation in the exhibit record 
could be found at the Bengtson FCE. There is no medical evidence to connect whatever Bengtson 
found to the work accident. His report was prepared 4-1/2 years after the accident and several 
years after Claimant's treating orthopedist found Claimant at maximum medical improvement. 
There is no evidence in the record that whatever Bengtson found was medically caused by the 
work accident. 
Dr. McNulty did not in his report give Claimant restrictions or opine Claimant has 
restrictions. 
Without a functional limitation, there is no objective way to determine how Claimant's 
ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced. Claimant has failed to carry his burden as the 
foundation under Brownell's opinion is not supportable by medical evidence or other evidence of 
probative value. 
Crum's vocational work is detailed and the foundation for his conclusion that Claimant 
has no disability in excess of impairment is sound. 
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Whether the Commission's finding that Claimant lacked credibility is clearly 
erroneous. If so, whether the evidence relied on by Commission constitutes 
substantial competent evidence. 
The Commission's conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not 
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Excell Constr. Inc. v. State, Dep 't of Labor, 141 
Idaho 688, 692, 116 P.3d 18, 22 (2005). This Court will not re-weigh the evidence or consider 
whether it would have drawn a different conclusion from the evidence presented. Id 
With regard to Claima.11t's credibility, the Cmn111ission concluded: 
Having reviewed the record and observed Claimant at hearing, the Commissioners 
find that Claimant is not a credible witness. His hearing testimony differed from 
his prior statements in depositions, interviews, and appointments with medical 
providers. As mentioned above, he told strikingly different stories regarding his 
separation from Employer. He was also inconsistent about his involvement in 
organized sports and his academic achievements. At deposition, he testified that in 
college, he was a "great" student who earned As and Bs; to Mr. Crum, he stated 
that he was an average student in both high school and college, graduating at 
North Idaho College with a 2.5 GPA. See D.E. 10, p. 111; D.E. 13, p. 135. 
Claimant also appears to be prone to exaggeration. He boasted to Dr. Sims that, 
prior to his injury, he rant twenty miles per day. See D.E. 5, p. 68. (At hearing, this 
changed to the far more plausible five miles per day; see Hearing Tr. 23.) He 
insists that he used to be able to leg press 1,375 pounds. Hearing Tr. 23. It is 
difficult for the Commission to credit such extraordinary athletic feats to an 
adolescent who attended school full-time, worked part-time, and was heavily 
involved in music. Having considered all of the above, the Commission regards 
Claimant's testimony as suspect where it is not supported by other evidence in the 
record. 
"Because this Court gives great deference to the Commission's conclusion regarding 
credibility and weight of evidence, the only issue before this Court is whether the evidence relied 
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on the Commission constitutes substantial and competent Knowlton v. Wood River 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 135,141,254, P.3d 36 (2011). 
Claimant carried the burden of proof on issues of impairment and disability in excess of 
impairment, if any. The Commission concluded it did not have to take Claimant's testimony as 
absolute truth when not corroborated by other evidence. In essence, it found that Claimant's 
testimony nonpersuasive standing by itself to establish a claim for disability in excess of 
impairment. The Commission's conclusions were supported by substantial competent evidence. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission findings are based upon substantial and competent evidence. 
The Appellant merely asks the Supreme Court to reweigh the evidence. 
The Industrial Commission orders must be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l~ day of January, 2015. 
~mey £ r Defendants/Respondents 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
H. JAMES MAGNUSON, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
That I am and at all times hereinafter mentioned was a citizen of the United States and a 
resident of the State ofldaho, over the age of 21 years, and not a party to this action; that I served 
the RESPONDENTS' BRIEF in the above-entitled action upon the attorney for the 
Claimant/ Appellant in the above matter as follows: 
Starr Kelso 
Kelso Law Office 
P. 0. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1312 
by depositing in the United States mail, with postage prepaid, two true copies of said 
Respondents' Brief on the I day of January, 2015, addressed to said attorney as 
hereinabove set forth. 
Further, on said date, the original and seven copies of said Respondents' Brief were sent 
via prepaid Federal Express, addressed to: 
Mr. Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
451 W. State Street 
Boise, ID 83 720-0 IO 1 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to beford\me :hir {d'-- day of January, 2015 . 
• ~w_g ~,, 
RESPONDENTS' BRJEF 
NotfilYPu lie for the State of Idaho 
Residing in Coeur d'Alene 
Commission Expires 3/8/2016 
30 
